Chapter 3
COMPANY B 1/27
(WOLFHOUNDS)

 

The plans for the next morning were to conduct a search-and-destroy operation through the jungle while maneuvering to the northeast so the various Companies could rejoin their parent battalions. However, the night was not quiet as the VC kept up almost constant probes; although refraining from mortar attacks. In response, Meloy called in artillery throughout the night. On the morning of 4 November, the Major once ordered Co. B 1/27 to move west to meet the battalion. At 1045 hours (10:45 am), Co.'s B and C 2/1, headed due east to link up with their Co. A which was located with the 4/31. Forty-five minutes later, the remainder of the command moved out heading northeast. Leading was Co. A 1/27 with a rifle platoon 2 minutes ahead as point and point flank security. Following as Co. C 3/21 and the remainder of Co. C 1/27. Meloy positioned himself and a radio operator at the rear of Co. A 1/27 while this command group moved at the rear of Co. C 3/21.

The jungle was extremely dense, limiting visibility to approximately 10 meters or less. Fortunately, radio transmission was, and remained good. Moving out in two columns, 40 meters apart, they were underway only a few minutes when the jungle erupted in fire. Major Meloy later recalled, "One moment it was quiet as can be, and the next instant it was like a Fort Benning Mad Minute." The contact we had was greater than a battalion (500-1200 men), and it had the heaviest concentration of automatic weapons I have ever heard. We were immediately pinned down from three sides: north, northeast, and east. For six hours, the fire never diminished; we had to should to be heard over the radio. The battalion fought off numerous suicide attacks by the enemy who was equipped with automatic weapons, steel helmets, webbed gear, and various uniforms. Even suicide assaults were launched against the friendly forces.

 
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