The
plans for the next morning were to conduct a search-and-destroy operation
through the jungle while maneuvering to the northeast so the various
Companies could rejoin their parent battalions. However, the night was
not quiet as the VC kept up almost constant probes; although refraining
from mortar attacks. In response, Meloy called in artillery throughout
the night. On the morning of 4 November, the Major once ordered Co.
B 1/27 to move west to meet the battalion. At 1045 hours (10:45 am),
Co.'s B and C 2/1, headed due east to link up with their Co. A which
was located with the 4/31. Forty-five minutes later, the remainder of
the command moved out heading northeast. Leading was Co. A 1/27 with
a rifle platoon 2 minutes ahead as point and point flank security. Following
as Co. C 3/21 and the remainder of Co. C 1/27. Meloy positioned himself
and a radio operator at the rear of Co. A 1/27 while this command group
moved at the rear of Co. C 3/21.
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The
jungle was extremely dense, limiting visibility to approximately 10 meters
or less. Fortunately, radio transmission was, and remained good. Moving
out in two columns, 40 meters apart, they were underway only a few minutes
when the jungle erupted in fire. Major Meloy later recalled, "One
moment it was quiet as can be, and the next instant it was like a Fort
Benning Mad Minute." The contact we had was greater than a battalion
(500-1200 men), and it had the heaviest concentration of automatic weapons
I have ever heard. We were immediately pinned down from three sides: north,
northeast, and east. For six hours, the fire never diminished; we had
to should to be heard over the radio. The battalion fought off numerous
suicide attacks by the enemy who was equipped with automatic weapons,
steel helmets, webbed gear, and various uniforms. Even suicide assaults
were launched against the friendly forces.
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